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DELETING THE BOLAR AMENDMENT TO
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT:
HARMONIZING PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT PROTECTION IN A GLOBAL
VILLAGE
NED MILENKOVICH*

Furnished as all Europe now is with Academies of Science,
with nice instruments and the spirit of experiment, the
progress of human knowledge will be rapid and discoveries
made of which we have at present no conception. I begin to be
almost sorry I was born so soon, since I cannot have the
happiness of knowing what will be known a hundred years
hence.'

INTRODUCTION

The Framers of the United States Constitution agreed with
inventor Benjamin Franklin in his respect for technological
progress and invention. The Framers found it so important that
they dedicated a clause in the Constitution to the protection of
intellectual property.!
Congress followed the Constitutional
provision by enacting laws that conferred exclusive time-limited
rights to an inventive entity that successfully patented a new
discovery.3 Furthermore, the United States government created
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) which will soon
occupy an eight-building 2.4 million-square foot complex in
Arlington, Virginia.4
* J.D. Candidate, June 2000. Pharm.D., University of Illinois-Chicago,
1997. B.S., Pharmacy, The Ohio State University, 1992.
1. Benjamin FranklinQuotes and Sayings (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <httpj/w

ww.kagi.com/micromatt/benf.htm>. This site contains interesting and useful
quotes by historical inventor and patriot Benjamin Franklin.
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (desiring "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
3. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1998) (stating "a term beginning on
the date which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which
the application for the patent was filed in the United States.
").
4. See $250 Shower Curtain?Relocating the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Offices Might Be a Cost-Saver, but Items Such as $100 Coat Racks are
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The traditional European view of patent protection was to
reward an inventor with a time-limited exclusive right to a patent
free from risk of infringement.' The Framers settled on the
European view that an inventor was entitled to a limited
monopoly for the benefit of social welfare.6 This view persists
today. However, the research-based pharmaceutical industry is
one sector of modern technology that is exempt from these
traditional views of exclusive patent protection.7
The U.S. research-based pharmaceutical industry seeks
strong patent laws to protect its research and development.8
Countries such as Italy saw pharmaceutical research and
development (R&D) increase by 600% after strengthening its own
patent laws. 9 This is easier to appreciate when one considers it is
much easier to copy a new drug product than it is to invent one.10

Drawing Heat, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 24, 1998, § 1, at 10 (describing the transition
into new PTO facilities and emphasizing potential price abuses through gross
over-payment of items that are typically a fraction of the cost).
5. See A. Samuel' Oddi, TRIPS - Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of
Economic Imperialism", 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 421 (1996) (describing
the French view during the "Age of Enlightenment" that an invention
belonged exclusively to the creator and holding otherwise would be a "violation
of the rights of humanity" and was reflected as such in the preamble to the
French Patent Act of 1791); see also WILLIAM H. FRANCIS & ROBERT C.
COLLINS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 5 (4th ed. 1995) (stating that
one of the earliest patent protection statutes appeared in Venice, Italy in 1432
A.D.). But see Oddi, supra, at 421-22 (stating that some economists were
opposed to the idea of patent rights). The Netherlands repealed its patent
statute temporarily, but reenacted it within 40 years. Id.
6. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1965) (stating that
Thomas Jefferson was opposed to monopolistic grants, but that he tempered
Jefferson thought the
this attitude toward inventions and literature).
granting of a monopoly was more of a privilege than a natural right and was
necessary for the furtherance of new discovery. Id. at 8-9.
7. See GATT and Pharmaceutical Patents: Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm. On Hatch-Waxman generic drug legislation and GATT,
available in 1996 WL 88348, at *3 (statement of Lauch Faircloth, Senator
from North Carolina) [hereinafter Faircloth] (stating that generic drug
companies are the only industry permitted to test and produce a patented
product prior to its expiration as a result of the Bolar amendment, which will
be further described infra).
8. See Phrma:Issues & Policy (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.phrma.o
rg/issues/protect.html> [hereinafter Phrma] (discussing reasons why strong
pharmaceutical patent protection is essential to the industry).
9. Id. Other countries like Canada had pharmaceutical R&D increase by
4.6% of sales within four years after strengthening of patent laws. Id.
Another notable statistic includes a study by the World Bank that determined
65% of drugs on the market would not be available in the absence of strong
patent laws. Id.
10. See GATT & Pharmaceutical Patents: Hearing Before. the Senate
Judiciary Comm. on Hatch-Waxman Generic Drug Legislation; GATT and
Global Patent Law, available in 1996 WL 283660, at *4-5 (statement of Gerald
J. Mossinghoff, President of Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
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Strong patent protection gives the inventive entity, as well as
others, the incentive to continue to invent knowing that their
intellectual property will be secure while benefiting society. "
The research-based pharmaceutical industry is responsible
for over 90% of new market drugs, 2 with U.S. companies
providing a major role in the development of the world's
pharmaceuticals.' 3 The research industry seeks to collaborate with
other pharmaceutical companies in developed countries worldwide
for the purpose of streamlining drug-regulatory laws while
maximizing patent protection.14
Similarly, the U.S. government has an interest in engaging in
America) [hereinafter Mossinghof1 (noting that a medication that has
development costs in the hundreds of millions of dollars and takes up to 15
years to develop can be duplicated quickly and inexpensively). Estimates by
the International Trade Commission indicate that $5 billion of patented
pharmaceuticals are pirated annually. Id. See also Patent Restoration Act
and Drug Price Competition: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Comm. On
the Economic Impact of Hatch-Waxman generic drug legislation and the
pharmaceuticalmarketplace, availablein 1996 WL 103668, at *3 (statement of
Henry G. Grabowski, Ph.D., Professor of Economics, Duke University)
[hereinafter Grabowski] (stating that the pharmaceutical industry has "the
lowest ratio of imitation costs to innovation costs" of all the hi-tech industries).
11. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 81-86

(1950). New technology serves society positively through a process known as
creative destruction, in which new technology eliminates old technology
through improvement. Id.
12. Mossinghoff, supra note 10, at 1. Most all new pharmaceuticals are
researched and developed in the research pharmaceutical industry with
enormous risks. Id. at 4. Each chemical structure isolated has a 1 in 6,000
chance of making it to market with an average cost of $359 million. Id. at 2;
accord Phrma,supra note 8 (noting that time involving drugs with a high risk
of failure prior to market can take 12-15 years to bring to market at a cost of
$500 million).
13. Phrma: Publications:Leading the Way (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://w
ww.phrma.org/publications/brochure/leading/lead9.html>.
In the past 20
years, the United States has developed almost half of the world's 150
breakthrough medications. Id. Pharmaceutical companies are currently
developing over 1,000 new medications for various illnesses with a work force
of over 250,000 people that include 50,000 scientists. Id. The average cost of
developing a new drug is $500 million, which is three times the value of a new
Boeing 747 jumbo jet. Id. See also Phrma: Facts & Figures: Phrma Facts
(visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www/phrma.org/facts/phfacts/8_97a.html>
(asserting that U.S. pharmaceutical companies are responsible for 36% of the
entire world R&D with the Japanese a "distant second" at 19%, followed by
Germany at 10%, and France at 9%).
14. Phrma:Issues & Policy (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.phrma.org/is
sues/intl.html>. The International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) is one
example of collaboration between research drug companies in the U.S.,
Europe, and Japan and has been formed to decrease and streamline drug
regulatory procedures with the intent to minimize delays of marketing a drug.
Id. Harmonizing regulatory laws in these three regions would decrease costly
and time consuming repetition of the same procedures, thereby reducing
marketing delays while the patient accesses new medication more quickly. Id.
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international trade agreements and tariff reductions, while
protecting global interests." Accordingly, the United States is a
strong advocate of global patent protection."6 This is evidenced by
its strong support for global agreements such as GATT 17 and
TRIPS, 8 to which the United States is a signatory. The United
States enforces these global agreements by way of a dispute
resolution system developed in the World Trade Organization
(WTO)" against offending member nations. 0
Prior to the U.S. global commitments to GATT, and
subsequently the WTO, Congress enacted the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (Hatch-Waxman
Act) in 1984." The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.2 The Hatch-Waxman Act sought
to:
23

1) encourage generic 'competition' in the pharmaceutical industry
by streamlining the process of regulatory approval for generics, 2)
15. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of GATT.
16. Faircloth,supra note 7, at 3. Senator Faircloth insisted "the U.S. was
the leading advocate for intellectual property protection in GATT." Id.
Faircloth expressed concern about continuing congressional interest in
undermining pharmaceutical protection and described any further
modification of the law as possibly "seriously damaging" intellectual property
laws. Id. at 1. He further expressed concern that creating exceptions to the
industry would "encourage developing countries to do the same" in their
efforts to whittle away at their GATT commitments. Id. at 3.
17. See infra Part I.A for a discussion of GATT.
18. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of TRIPS.
19. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of WTO.
20. See infra note 66 for a description of some of the enforcing activities the
U.S. engaged in at the WTO.
21. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 [hereinafter Hatch-Waxman Act] (codified in
scattered sections of Titles 21 and 35).
See also Diane Furman,
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Licensing and the Patent/Regulatory
Background, 514 PLI/PAT 7, 14-15 (1998) (stating the objectives of the HatchWaxman Act). The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
is commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman Act, its regulation aims to
modify patent laws as they pertain to new and generic drug approval methods.
Id.
22. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 4ct of 1913, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52
Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93). HatchWaxman included several amendments to this earlier legislation. Id. One
notable amendment was that generics were no longer required to duplicate
costly research and submit test data to the FDA for purposes of drug approval.
Furman, supra note 21, at 14. This dramatically decreased generic costs and
would have the effect of decreasing the amount of time necessary to get the
generic equivalent to market after the research drug patent expires. Id.
23. Generic drug companies do not typically engage in novel drug research,
but rather re-develop an already discovered drug and market it at a much
lower cost upon its patent expiration. They are able to do this because there
are very little research dollars necessary to re-develop the drug compared to
what it would cost to actually discover it.
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stimulate investment in pharmaceutical research and development
by restoring to the patent owner a part of the patent term consumed
by regulatory delay, and 3) facilitate immediate competition in the
marketplace upon patent expiration by securing for the generic
industry an exemption from infringement activities relating to FDA
submissions. 4
The Hatch-Waxman Act attempted to strike a balance
between competing interests. The Act weighed the public interest
in gaining faster access to a cheaper generic drug against the
research industry's financial incentive to discover a new drug
product. 5
This Comment addresses a single amendment encompassed
26
The
in the Hatch-Waxman Act known as the Bolar Amendment.
Bolar Amendment enables a generic drug manufacturer to use an
inventor's drug product prior to patent expiration for purposes of
27
Therefore, the
meeting FDA requirements for market approval.
Bolar Amendment exempts what would otherwise be classified as
This patent
patent infringement of the proprietary drug.
exception is inconsistent with the United States negotiating
position, which sought maximal patent protection, in the global
Furthermore, Article 30 of
agreement known as GATT-TRIPS.'
the GATT-TRIPS agreement only allows exceptions to patent
Therefore, the Bolar
exclusivity in very limited situations.'
24. Furman, supra note 21, at 15; Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 21.
25. See generally Judiciary Committee Revisits the Hatch-Waxman Act, J.
PROPRIETARY RTS., May 1996, at 26 (describing the intent of the Act at the
time of its creation in 1984 and the extent to which it has been successful to
date in achieving its stated goals, taking into account any amendments to the
Act which may be needed in light of changing societal expectations and market
forces).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Commonly referred to as the Bolar Amendment,
section 271(e)(1) states:
[i]t shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell a
patented invention [other than new animal drugs or veterinary
biological products using genetic manipulation techniques] solely for
uses reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use,
or sale of drugs.
Id.
27. See Gregory J. Glover, Impact of Hatch-Waxman Goes Beyond Generics,
NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1997, at C7 (explaining the exemption to patent
infringement granted to generics for activities related to submission of
information for product approval).
28. S. REP. No. 103-412, at 112-17 (1994) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
29. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33
I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Article 30 of TRIPS states,
"[m]embers may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by
a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate
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Amendment may be in violation of Article 30 of the GATT-TRIPS
agreement to which the United States is a signatory.
This Comment examines the validity of the Bolar Amendment
in light of Article 30 of GATT-TRIPS. Part I explains GATT,
TRIPS and the WTO. Part I further describes the binding nature
of the WTO and the ability of one nation to bring a legal complaint
against another member nation violating any of the WTO
provisions. Part I then explains United States interests in
maximizing global patent protection. Part II explains the origins
of the Bolar Amendment and compares the European view on the
Bolar Amendment that contrasts the United States position. Part
III analyzes the degree to which the Bolar Amendment prejudices
the research pharmaceutical industry while considering the public
interest the amendment serves. Part III also examines a possible
outcome of a complaint against the United States in the WTO
regarding the Bolar Amendment. Finally, Part IV proposes
deleting the Bolar Amendment and offers an alternative method
for providing cost-effective drugs to the public.
I. GATT, TRIPS, AND THE WTO
Global efforts to reduce tariffs and increase trade, while
protecting national interests, have led to several global
agreements between developed and developing nations. This Part
describes an important agreement called the General Agreement
on Tariff and Trade (GATT). GATT began as an attempt to
stimulate the global economy in 1947 and eventually evolved into
the present day World Trade Organization (WTO). ° The WTO is a
permanent international organization that regulates transnational
trade. 3' This Part also explains the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which is the
section of GATT that addresses international intellectual property
rights and protection.
A. GATT

After World War II, the United States and England
attempted to stabilize the world economy.32 Concurrently, a panel
interests of third parties." Id.
30. KONSTATINOS ADAMANTOPOULOS, AN ANATOMY OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 1-8 (1997).

31. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of WTO.
32. ADAMANTOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 1-8.

Discussions of regulating

post-war trade were imperative to combat global protectionist obstacles. Id.
While the U.S. and England began their bi-lateral talks, a committee was
established to create what would be a pre-cursor organization known as the
International Trade Organization (ITO). Id. Additionally, 23 other nations
began to have trade and tariff reduction negotiations in which 45,000 tariff
reductions resulted in the elimination of $10 billion in trade tariffs. Id. at 1-2.
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of twenty-three countries worked together in an effort to stimulate
the world economy by signing a global agreement, known as
GATT, in Geneva, Switzerland on October 30, 1947. 3' The initial
GATT agreement was meant to create a temporary administrative
body whose mission would be to carry out economic stimulating
measures taken up by a separate group, called the International
Trade Organization (ITO), which was primarily composed of the
United States and England.3 4 However, United States support for
the ITO collapsed when Congress refused to endorse the
organization.3 5 This left GATT as the sole instrument for
promoting world trade, and the only major stabilizing mechanism
for the post World War II global economy."
GATT was used as a means for opening up protectionist
markets and increasing transnational trade." GATT began in
1947 but evolved via eight "Rounds" which ultimately led to the
1994 version of GATT and eventually the WTO in the final
GATT
negotiating round known as the "Uruguay Round."'
became increasingly expansive with the conclusion of every
negotiating "Round" and addressed many trade barrier concerns

33. Id. at 2. The signatories ratified what is known as GATT-1947, which
is distinguished from GATT-1994, although the latter is an outgrowth from
the former and encompasses a majority of its original principles. Id.
34. Id. The two groups comprising GATT and ITO existed in parallel and
ultimately both worked toward the same goal of creating a more stable world
economy. Id. At the time, the ITO had the benefit of working together with
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Id. at 1.
35. MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE To THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 31-34

(1996). Congress opposed the ITO due to perceived failures by the British
government to "restore convertibility" and also because of the ensuing Cold
War and the global impact that ITO would have in light of the presence of the
USSR. Id. at 31. It is notable to consider that although the. ITO failed to pass
Congress at the time, it would live again because the ITO charter had all the
.configurations" of the modern World Trade Organization (WTO). Id.
36. Id. In order for GATT to be accepted as a global agreement after the
ITO was rejected by Congress, it had to take the form of a provisional
agreement. Id. GATT was also referred to as a "trade agreement" and was
within the United States Trade Agreements Act of 1945, thereby avoiding the
requirement of Senate ratification. Id. It is of historical interest and
relevancy that great pains were taken to refer to the signatories as
"contracting parties," rather than "signatories" or "members." Id.
37. See GILBERT R. WINHAM, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

AGREEMENTS 43-44 (1992) (stating that GATT was used to prevent national
market protectionism through tariff reductions and agreements).
38. See ADAMANTOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 2-4 (describing the
progression of the GATT agreement through eight rounds of talks, which
culminated in the Uruguay Round). The Uruguay Round began in 1986 and
concluded in 1993 with a total membership of 125 countries. Id. GATT rules
were once again expanded and for the first time given force through the
establishment of the WTO which granted the world a binding dispute
resolution system. Id.
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including nondiscriminatory treatment of other GATT members,
the abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports/exports, and
special exemptions for developing member countries. 9 After the
Uruguay Round, GATT took its most complete form for creating
global trade regulations. ° Countries worldwide signed GATT
which took the appropriate name, "Draft Final Act" (DFA).4" The
U.S. Congress passed the GATT agreement, and following
President Clinton's signing in December 1994, the United States
officially committed itself as an international signatory.42
B. TRIPS
During the Uruguay Round, discussions were expanded to
include intellectual property protection. 43 Developed countries had
valid concerns regarding piracy of intellectual property and
lobbied heavily for strong international rules to protect an
inventive entity from suffering financial ruin as a result of
infringing activity." These negotiations gave rise to an agreement
39. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http:/
/www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/gatt.htm>
[hereinafter GATT].
This web-site provides a truncated history of GATT and its evolution into a
more expansive global commitment that eventually became binding on the
signatories at the Uruguay Rounds. Id.
40. See BLAKENEY, supra note 35, at 36-38 (discussing the transfer of the
GATT to the WTO with all previous Rounds encompassed within the scope of
transfer which was consummated at the Marrakesh Conference).
41. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). See also BLAKENEY, supra note 35,
at 35-36 (describing the culmination of the Uruguay Round and the
groundwork of the WTO).
42. See Robert M. Storwick, GATT's Effects on Patents (last modified Oct.
20, 1995) <http://www.patent-it.com/gattpat.html> (describing the ratification
of GATT along with the TRIPS agreement). TRIPS is a sub-section of GATT
that addresses global intellectual property protection, including patent
protection. Id.
43. See BLAKENEY, supra note 35, at 39-43 (discussing the basic principles
of the TRIPS agreement); see also Trade in Intellectual Property (visited Sept.
3,
1998)
<http://www.wto.org/intellec/intell2.htm>
(discussing
the
implementation of global patent protection, global trademark protection, and
global copyright protection in the field of intellectual property).
44. See Oddi, supra note 5, at 424 (discussing industry concerns regarding
impostor "counterfeiting" of intellectual property and efforts to minimize these
illegal activities); see also SEYMOUR J. RUBIN & MARK L. JONES, CONFLICT
AND RESOLUTION IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS AT THE OPENING OF THE

URUGUAY ROUND 230-33 (1989) (describing the reasons why the United States
thought it was important to begin global talks on intellectual property
protection). Among the many reasons were concerns about cheap, high quality
imitations by countries such as Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore
resulting in widespread piracy and counterfeiting. RUBIN & JONES, supra, at
230-33. The U.S. noted there were innovations on the horizon that were of
significant importance necessitating increased protection. Id. at 231. Another
major factor leading to discussions of the TRIPS agreement involved the
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known as TRIPS." TRIPS is a single section of the vast GATT
agreement, concerning itself entirely with global intellectual
property protection.4"
TRIPS signaled a global commitment
toward securing intellectual property rights of inventors in order
to reward new discoveries and ensure future research and
development. TRIPS is a comprehensive agreement devoted to
intellectual property, and Articles 27-34 of TRIPS address member
nations' responsibilities related to patent law.47
Article 30 of TRIPS prohibits infringement of a patent only if
the legitimate interests of a patent owner are unreasonably
prejudiced. 8 Opponents of the Bolar Amendment contend that the
amendment violates TRIPS because it discriminates against an
industry by allowing exploitation of a patent prior to its
expiration. 49 The currently prevailing European view insists the
Bolar Amendment runs counter to the TRIPS agreement because
the innovator should have exclusive rights to a patent.i ° Although
Congress probably did not contemplate the TRIPS agreement in
1984 when it enacted the Bolar Amendment, an increasingly interdependent global economy suggests that domestic laws should be
modified to accommodate global commitments.
C. WTO
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, the U.S. government
ratified all of GATT, including the TRIPS agreement. 51 However,
dissatisfaction of WIPO's ability to enforce IP laws. Id. at 232-33 n.5. Both
WIPO and UNESCO are specialized United Nations (UN) agencies that
address intellectual property and "educational, scientific and cultural
matters." Id.
45. See ADAMANTOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 22-23 (describing the TRIPS
agreement); see also The Roots of the WTO (visited Sept. 3, 1998) <http://www.

econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ355/choi/wtoroots.htm>

(describing the history

surrounding GATT, TRIPS, and the WTO).
46. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29.
47. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, arts. 27-34.
48. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29.
49. EU Court Ruling Deals a Setback To Generics Arm, CHEMICAL MARKET
REPORTER, Aug. 4, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8497538 [hereinafter

CHEMICAL MARKET REP.].

Brian Yorke, the corporate head of intellectual

property at Novartis stated "[t]he Bolar provisions discriminate against a
specific industrial sector by allowing third parties to exploit a product...

before its patent expires."). Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 2. Another opponent of the Bolar amendment believes that a
recent European court ruling described infra demonstrates that "[i]t is an
endorsement of the prevailing political view... in the [European Union] that

the way to jobs and prosperity is through innovation and generation of new
products," and he adds, "[t]he U.S. position on TRIPS and the Bolar

amendment is unsatisfactory... the European Court has reinforced the view
that the Bolar amendment is in contradiction of TRIPS." Id. at 5.
51. JOHN H. JACKSON & ALAN 0. SYKES, IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY
ROUND 175-76 (1997). Although the GATT agreement was controversial and
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the signatories of GATT had an interest in advancing the
temporary nature of the agreement by creating a permanent
organizational structure."
The DFA at the Uruguay Round
contained a provision expressing the desirability of such measures,
and discussions were planned to create such an organization at the
conclusion of the Round.53 Once all the attending countries
approved the DFA, a ministerial-level meeting concluded the
Uruguay Round and prepared for the Marrakesh Conference of
Trade Ministers to create a permanent body known as the WTO.5"
By January 1, 1995, the United States had accepted the WTO
agreement along with 76 of the original 125 nations present at the
Uruguay Round.5"
The remaining nations needed to take
additional
steps
domestically
to
satisfy
membership
requirements,56 which was accomplished through an application
process.7
There are six differences between GATT and the WTO.5 All
involved heated debate, the House of Representatives passed the agreement
by a vote of 288-146, and the Senate by a vote of 76-24. Id. at n.2.
52. BLAKENEY, supra note 35, at 34. The provisional nature of the GATT
meant it was a temporary body that presented member nations with
guidelines in their global agreements. Id. at 31. Countries could easily balk
at provisions that were not agreeable to them and frequently disregarded
them if contrary to national interests. Id. The desire to transform GATT into
a permanent organization was to combat such attitudes. Id. In 1993, GATT
was no longer an agreement attempting to stimulate a floundering post World
War II economy, but rather an attempt to streamline international trade by
eliminating barriers. Id. at 36-37.
53. Id. at 34-35. The idea of creating a permanent organization was not to
begin an organization independent from GATT and the Uruguay Round
Agreements, but rather to absorb the approved contents of the "Draft Final
Act" (DFA) into the new organization. Id. at 35.
54. See id. at 36-38 (stating on April 14, 1994, the Marrakesh agreement
was signed and transfer of all property and financial assets of GATT to WTO
were effectuated thereby concluding the GATT rounds and the creation of a
permanent global organization charged with the task of overseeing world
trade); see also ADAMANTOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 28-30 (describing the
transition from GATT to the WTO).
55. ADAMANTOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 56.

56. Id. Because some member nations present at the Uruguay Round did
not satisfy criteria to accede to the WTO from GATT "membership," the two
organizations co-existed for a one year period in order to maintain continuity
in multi-lateral agreements. Id. Since the original GATT agreements were
fully encompassed in the WTO, maintaining duality of these organizations
afforded acceding countries the benefits of the guidelines established in GATT
prior to meeting their WTO prerequisites for membership. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 29-30. The first major difference is that in the predecessor GATT,
side agreements were created through the various "rounds" which fostered the
evolution of GATT. Id. The WTO absorbs all previous agreements created
and administers them as one unified proposal. Id. Additionally, the WTO has
an expanded role in that it includes Trades in Services, intellectual property,
and a major role in the environment. Id. Further, the GATT rules, which
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of the differences are designed to improve the status of the WTO
as a binding, permanent and legitimate international trade
Along with this
organization with enforcement capabilities.
to abide
countries
permanency came the responsibility of member
TRIPS
in
the
by the intellectual property rules set forth
59
agreement. The TRIPS agreement was pursued vigorously by the
United States in the Uruguay Round and supported by all
developed nations. 6 The end result of this Round was to include
global intellectual property rights issues within the jurisdiction of
the WTO and its binding dispute resolution authority.6'

were crafted in the Uruguay Round (known as GATT-1994), are re-stated in
the WTO and strengthened regarding goods trading. Id. Another major
difference between GATT and the WTO is that provisions in GATT, which
gave exceptions to specific trade sectors, will be phased out. Id. This means
that countries can no longer decline to adhere to WTO rules as they once did
in GATT. Id. All aspects of international trade will be governed by the new
WTO rules. Id. Additionally, WTO will have a broader membership potential
than GATT. Id. Finally, WTO members will not have the luxury of blocking
decisions against them within the dispute settlement mechanisms set forth in
the WTO dispute panel as they did in GATT. Id.
59. THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL

TRADE REGULATION

62-66 (Philip

Ruttley et al. eds., 1998). Aggrieved individual intellectual property rights
holders will seek dispute resolution through the WTO against offending
This, however, will be effectuated through domestic
persons. Id.
governments. Id. For example, if company A in Serbia is aggrieved by
company B in South Africa, the government of Serbia will bring action against
the government in South Africa on behalf of company A or the industry in
which company A resides.
60. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 112-17.
61. See THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 59,

at 62 (stating "[t]he WTO could become the Global Supreme Court of
intellectual property."). Advocates of the TRIPS agreement in developed
countries were eager supporters of strong intellectual property rights and
many countries were faced with the daunting task of having to learn "highly
protective [intellectual property] laws." Id. at 64. Scores of countries that had
weak intellectual property laws had to learn new standards of protection,
including a new vocabulary. Id. Failure to master these newfound laws
meant potential liability in the global marketplace at the mercy of the WTO.
See also About the WTO (last modified Feb. 6, 1998)
Id.
<http://www.wto.org/wto/about/dispute/.htm> (stating "no review of the
achievement of the WTO would be complete without mentioning the dispute
settlement system, in many ways the central pillar of the multi-lateral trading
system and the WTO's most individual contribution to the stability of the
global economy."). This web-site also sets out the stages of dispute resolution
that creates the timetables for resolving each stage of the dispute. The first
stage begins with consultations between the parties. Id. The second stage is
the panel appointing stage in the event consultations fail. Id. Hearings,
interim reports, reviews, and a final report follow this. Id. The final report
then becomes a ruling that may be appealed. Id. See also DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE WTO 28-53 (James Cameron & Karen Campbell eds.,
1998) (detailing the dispute resolution system in the WTO).
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D. Global Enforcement: Policing Through the WTO
Shortly after the Uruguay Round, Congress and the President
committed the United States to the WTO through enactment of
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA).62
During the
Uruguay Round, the United States was the leading proponent for
strong global intellectual property protection.68 At the Uruguay
Round, and subsequently at the time of the URAA enactment, the
United States continued to voice concerns about discriminatory
acts by foreign signatories and insisted the WTO be used as a
continuing mechanism for maximally protecting U.S. interests in
intellectual property.' This was not a novel concern for Congress
either, as it sought a means for creating a global dispute
settlement system as part of its mandating negotiating objectives
in the Uruguay Round.6
With the creation of the WTO, the
United States will make good on its promise to enforce WTO rules
against violating countries; it has successfully brought complaints
against several nations since the inception of the WTO and its
dispute settlement body (DSB)."6 Despite the TRIPS agreement,

62. See generally Lauren A. Degnan, Does U.S. Patent Law Comply with
TRIPS Articles 3 and 27 with Respect to the Treatment of Inventive Activity?,
78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY 108 (1996) (discussing the impact of the
URAA on current U.S. law regarding intellectual property and the ways in
which the URAA changes domestic law to conform to U.S. global commitments
set forth in the WTO).
63. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 117. The Committee report states in
part "it is the U.S. objective to seek to prevent or eliminate discrimination
with respect to matters affecting availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance,
use and enforcement of intellectual property rights." Id. It further states "the
Committee recognizes that much progress has been made over the past decade
in the intellectual property area, but believes it is clear that more work needs
to be done to ensure the strongest possible protection for U.S. intellectual
property abroad." Id.
64. See id. (stating Congress' concern that U.S. interests continue to be
addressed through the WTO after enactment of the URAA).
65. THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGULATION, supra note 59, at
123.
66. WTO Seeks Change in Patent Laws, INDIA TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at 1-3,
available in 1998 WL 11448152. The U.S. brought complaint against India in
the WTO because India did not provide adequate mechanisms for domestic
pharmaceutical patent protection. Id. The ruling was granted in favor of the
U.S. and India was given 30 days to report to the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) to inform it of what corrective action it would take. Id. See also India
faces curbs threat from WTO, THE HINDU, Dec. 22, 1997, at 1-4, available in
1997 WL 16015550 (describing further the power of the WTO to enforce global
cooperation of its membership and compliance with its rules). Accord, Thai

Herb decision angers Americans: US says local law violates WTO rules,
BANGKOK POST, Aug. 23, 1997, at 1-2, available in 1997 WL 13374115. The
U.S. brought complaint against Thailand because of the local Thai Traditional
Medicine Bill that the U.S. thought would inhibit pharmaceutical research in
violation of WTO rules. Id. The Thai government argued against this
complaint in the DSB by stating that it was an agricultural country, therefore
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which was adopted by the WTO rules, many countries continue to
undermine their global obligations in the area of intellectual
property.67
These countries may find themselves in the
uncomfortable position of answering complaints to the WTO and
suffering global trade sanctions if they fail to take prompt
corrective action.

II. THE BOLAR AMENDMENT
U.S. interests in maximally protecting intellectual property
internationally through support of the TRIPS agreement are in
sharp contrast with the domestic enactment of the Bolar
Amendment.
Section A explains the judicial and legislative
background surrounding the Bolar Amendment. Section A also
discusses the Bolar inconsistency in U.S. domestic policy regarding
intellectual property protection compared to its global position.
Section B explains the difference between the prevailing European
view on the Bolar Amendment and the U.S. position.
A. The Bolar Amendment: Origins and Effects
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic drug makers were
required to perform costly tests and generate independent data for
purposes of FDA drug approval, despite the fact that a drug had
already been discovered and tested by the research industry. The
Bolar Pharmaceutical Company, a generic drug maker, became a
defendant when Roche Products, Inc., a research company,
complained that Bolar was using its product for purposes of FDA
approval prior to patent expiration.69 Bolar admitted it had

it ought to be able to enact laws to protect its "agricultural products" without
conflict with the TRIPS agreement. Id.
67. See GATT and Pharmaceutical Patents: Hearing Before the Senate
Judiciary Comm. on URAA, TRIPS and Legislation Affecting the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, available in 1996 WL 287067 (Feb. 27, 1996)
(statement of William E. Brock, former U.S. Trade Representative and
Secretary of Labor under President Reagan) [hereinafter Brock] (stating that
several countries including Japan, Portugal, Australia, Argentina, and Brazil
have attempted to undermine TRIPS in various ways ranging from failing to

modify domestic patent terms to not implementing the TRIPS agreement at all
despite representing that they have).
68. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355)
(Supp. 1962) (amended 1984). The original act maintained that the generic

drug industry needed to submit its own independent data for obtaining FDA
marketing approval. Id. The work was redundant because the initial
invention had to sustain this same FDA standard. Perhaps the logical reason
for this requirement was that the FDA did not have a separate generic "track"
for market approval at the time, but rather treated all applications for drug

approval in the same way.
69. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 256-57
(E.D.N.Y. 1983). See also Susan Kopp Keyack, The Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term RestorationAct of 1984: Is it a Healthy Long Term Solution?,
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possession of the drug, but argued this was permissible for
purposes of FDA drug approval. 0 Although the trial court agreed
with Bolar, 1 the appellate court reversed and stated that Bolar
was not limiting its possession of the drug to "scientific inquiry,"
but rather intended to ultimately exploit the drug product for
profit and was therefore in violation of existing patent laws."2 The
appellate decision reflects a historic judicial posture that frowns
upon infringing activity unless its purpose is for "philosophical
curiosity" and nothing more.7 ' Therefore, the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals deemed defendant Bolar as having engaged in
infringing activity.74
Subsequently, Congress legislated the Bolar Amendment"
into the Hatch-Waxman Act.7 ' The Bolar Amendment enables a
generic drug maker to use the patented drug for purposes of
seeking FDA market approval without liability for patent
infringement.77 This enables a generic drug maker to market on
the first day of patent expiration by having FDA requirements
satisfied in a timely manner.
The coined phrase "Bolar
Amendment" came into existence because Congress essentially
overruled the Federal Circuit Court ruling.
The pharmaceutical industry is the only industry that
21 RUTGERS L.J. 147, 153-56 (1989) (describing the facts of the Bolar case

which ultimately led to the legislative enactment allowing the activity to
which the appellate court was opposed).
70. See Keyack, supra note 69, at 153 (describing Bolar's position during

the litigation).
71. Bolar, 572 F. Supp. at 256-58.
72. See, e.g., Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (stating that Bolar's use of the drug constituted "a violation of the

patent laws in the guise of 'scientific inquiry'.

.

. [which] has definite,

cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes").
73. Thomas F. Poche, The Clinical Trial Exemption From Patent
Infringement: JudicialInterpretationof Section 271(E)(1), 74 B.U. L. REV. 903,

909-10 (1994) (characterizing the experimental use exception in the case of
Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600)).
Justice Story was 'riding the circuit' when he spoke from the Massachusetts
Circuit Court bench stating "it could never have been the intention of the
legislature to punish a man, who constructed... a machine merely for
philosophical experiment, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of
the machine to produce its described effect." Id.
74. Id. at 910. Bolar asserted "public policy favors generic drugs and thus

mandates the creation of a new exception." Id. It further insisted it was
prejudiced by the added delay to market because of the FDA process thereby

unjustly giving the research company an extended time frame of exclusivity.
Id. However, the Federal Circuit ruled that Bolar's intended use was for
commercial purposes and was infringing on Roche's patent. Id.
75. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
76. Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 21. See also Poche, supra note 73, at

911 (stating that it took Congress only five months to legislate the HatchWaxman Act after the judicial decision).

77. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1); Keyack, supra note 69, at 160-61.
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exempts a prospective infringer from violating long-standing
principles of patent exclusivity.18 Ironically, this runs counter to
the U.S. negotiating position during the Uruguay Round, when it
so
vehemently
supported
maximal
patent
protection. 9
Domestically, Congress sought to benefit the general public by
enacting a patent infringement exception by way of the Bolar
Amendment;8 0 however, internationally, Congress mandated that
negotiations at the Uruguay Round be geared toward securing the
strongest possible patent laws.81
This inconsistency has met resistance in the European Union
(EU), which recently decided that this type of activity infringes on
the research company and is prohibited. 8 In addition, the Bolar
debate has continued in countries such as Canada, which is
currently under attack in the WTO on the Bolar Amendment
issue.
Among the many issues surrounding the Bolar
Amendment is the argument that the amendment violates Article
30 of TRIPS.
B. Europe vs. United States-Opposing Views
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that an act of
patent infringement occurs when a generic drug maker uses a
patented drug for purposes of regulatory approval.4 This has
78. See Faircloth, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that the generic
pharmaceutical industry enjoys advantages free from patent infringement

that exists in no other industry).
79. SENATE REPORT, supra note 28, at 117.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 14 (1984). Bill co-sponsor Representative

Waxman from California stated:
What we have is a total bill that I think is very good. It provides lowcost, generic drugs for millions of Americans, saving maybe a billion

dollars over a several year period .... Twenty percent of the people who
buy drugs in this country are elderly. Medicare does not pay for
drugs... so that is coming out of the pockets of the elderly.
Id.
81. SENATE REPORT, supra, note 28, at 117.

82. See, e.g., Case C-316/95, Generics BV v. Smith Kline & French Lab.
Ltd., 1997 CEC (CCH) 1029 (1997) (stating that a patent holder of a
pharmaceutical had a right to oppose infringing activity for purposes of drug

approval in Europe).
83. Jill Wechsler, Equivalence, Equity & Exclusivity, PHARMACEUTICAL
ExEcuTivE, May 1, 1998, at 11. This article describes global problems related
to the Bolar amendment and discusses countries currently embroiled in the
Bolar debate. Id. Some of them include Australia, which currently has
pending legislation, Israel, which has recently approved such legislation, and
Canada, which is currently being challenged on the Bolar issue in the WTO.
Id. at 12.
84. See Generics BV, 1997 CEC (CCH) 1029. See also Judgment of EU
Court on Generic Medicines and Patent Rights, IPL NEWSL. (Section I.P. Law,
A.B.A., Chicago, Ill.), Summer 1998, at 47. The Generics BV v. SKF case

decision reflects a similar viewpoint held by the U.S. judiciary. There is no
legislation currently in the EU that overrules the judicial decision, therefore
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caused continuing debate from both generic and research groups
who are increasingly embattled in the legitimacy of the Bolar
Amendment.85 While the U.S. position is that the Bolar provision
is allowed within the meaning of TRIPS, the European view runs
counter by insisting that such legislation is not permitted within
the global patent provisions of TRIPS.6 Resolution of this issue
will promote global harmony on patent protection, while continued
discord serves the purpose of undermining efforts of the Uruguay
Round that created TRIPS. A breakdown of a consistent global
policy on patent protection may hamper U.S. efforts to subdue
global piracy protection of an inventive entity.87 The United States
would be setting a world example by deleting legislation that calls
for "feel-good" exceptions to the principle of exclusive patent
protection.
While the research industry presses Congress to re-examine
the Hatch-Waxman legislation,' the international community is
watching to see whether the Bolar Amendment violates the TRIPS
agreement, to which the United States is a signatory and subject
to WTO review.
While research companies complain of
unreasonable prejudice resulting in unfair patent infringement,
the Bolar Amendment has opened a global Pandora's box of
inconsistencies as the EU fears economic backlash if U.S. generics
seek alternative markets to obtain their bulk active ingredients. 9
the current law forbids generic drug companies from using the patented drug
for regulatory approval unlike in the U.S. Id.
85. CHEMICAL MARKET REP., supra note 49.
European research
pharmaceutical makers insist that the U.S. Bolar amendment is in violation of
TRIPS because of its discriminatory nature in violating the rights of a specific
industry. Id. However, bulk active producers (generics) insist upon legislation
that is of the Bolar-type. Id.

86. Id.
87. See J. H. Reichman, Compliance with the TRIPS Agreement:
Introduction to a Scholarly Debate, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 363, 381 (1996)

(stating that nations such as the U.S. have undermined the provisions of the
TRIPS agreement while demanding compliance from other member nations).
If the U.S. cannot lead by example through compliance of its obligations in the
TRIPS agreement, other nations will soon decline to comply also. Id. at 382.
88. Wechsler, supra note 83, at 13.

Congress is expected to take up the

legislation again in order to re-examine whether the public interest in
receiving a generic alternative is being outweighed by financial injury to the
pharmaceutical companies that may inhibit research and development. Id.
Although profitable innovator companies may have trouble demonstrating
this, sharp price increases in the generic sector may render generics in the
awkward position of excessive profitability at the expense of the research
industry. Id. at 13-14.
89. Id. at 11. This is just one possibility whereby the EU may feel
financially oppressed as a result of lack of uniformity in interpretation of a

law. European generic companies may also relocate their businesses to the
U.S. where they may find a safe-haven in the U.S. law not available in Europe.
This runs counter to the idea of GATT that sought to harmonize and
streamline transnational policy and laws to facilitate trade and decrease

1999]

Deleting the Bolar Amendment

III. PREJUDICING THE PHARMACEUTICAL INVENTOR: THE BOLAR
AMENDMENT HAS FINANCIAL EFFECTS THAT PUNISH THE INVENTIVE
ENTITY WHILE REWARDING INFRINGERS WITH A BRIGHT FUTURE.

Carving out a patent exception financially deprives an
innovator while rewarding a "copier."9° Although the public
benefits in the short term, the question of long term public harm
due to inhibition of research is not so clear. Additionally, the
United States may lose in the event of an international legal
complaint through the WTO for violating Article 30 of TRIPS.
A. Adverse FinancialEffects

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has recently issued a
report that determined new drug investment return for the
research industry has decreased by 12% since the introduction of
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 9' This amounted to a $27 million decline
on average return per drug in 1990 dollars. 92 The final draft also
reported that the rapid market onset created by the Bolar
Amendment resulted in an average generic market share of 60%
within three years of marketing, contrasted with 5.1% before the
Hatch-Waxman Act.93 This demonstrates that while the generic
company did not invent the proprietary drug,94 the Bolar
Amendment benefits generics by speeding FDA approval and
allowing marketability immediately upon patent expiration,
thereby enabling generics to penetrate the market quickly. This
contrasts market timing for the inventive entity because a
research company must labor many years after receiving a patent
to obtain FDA approval, while fighting the patent clock. 95
The National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
(NAPM), representing the generic industry, contends that
tariffs.

The current Bolar debate could have the opposite effect of de-

stabilizing global cooperation if it is not resolved soon. Id. at 13-14.
90. New Drug Investment Return Down 12% Since Waxman/Hatch - CBO
Report, PINK SHEET, Aug. 3, 1998, at 5, available in 1998 WL 8441708
[hereinafter CBO Report].

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 4 (explaining that the new data will be used by the research
industry to seek repeal of the Bolar amendment when it is reviewed in 1999).
94. See Brock, supra note 67, at 12-13 (stating that generic companies exist
because of research drug companies, and although they provide a valuable

service, they should not be allowed to infringe upon the proprietary drug if the
patent is valid).
95. Senate Panel Considers Impact of 1984 Law on Drug Development and
Availability, PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW DAILY (BNA), Mar. 15,

1996, at 6 [hereinafter BNA]. Gerald Mossinghoff stated that it cost about
$100 million and eight to ten years of research in 1984 (when Hatch-Waxman

was enacted) compared to $500 million and fifteen years today to bring a drug
to market. Id. He added that patent protection has shrunk by five years since
the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id.
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blockbuster drugs such as Viagra® re-coup their costs within the
first six months of marketing. 96 However, the CBO found that only
the top six drugs marketed earned $1 billion, and only the top
twenty drugs earned more than $200 million, which is less than
the average cost of developing a drug.97 The CBO also noted that
peak sales of a drug are typically reached after a decade on the
market." This implies that some drugs never attain a reasonable
rate of return on investment while some generics arrive
immediately upon patent expiration and become profitable.99 With
substantial profits dwindling and the risks of failure so great, the
future holds a decrease of drugs in the research pipeline. This will
ultimately lead to a decrease in social welfare. 1' ° The generic
industry points to record levels of research and development
investment by research companies."' This, however, may be a
reflection of the complex research that is presently required to
initiate new discoveries such as with recombinant DNA
biotechnology, rather than solely from increased profits from
sales.' O2 Further, although a proprietary drug has a minimum five96. Telephone Interview with Dr. Leon Shargel, Vice-President and
Technical Director, National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
(NAPM) (Oct. 19, 1998).
97. CBO Report, supra note 90, at 4-5. This indicates that the majority of
drugs on the market are not as lucrative as one may believe given the overall
research and development costs that need to be returned. Id. Additionally,
one should consider the degree to which a new start-up pharmaceutical
company would be precluded from investing into research given the risks of
not meeting the return on investment. Id. See also Kerry Capell, Will Zeneca
Get an Offer it Can't Refuse?, BUS. WEEK, July 20, 1998, at 3, available in
1998 WL 8133302 (describing that although there is much research to be done
in the pharmaceuticals. sector, research continues to become increasingly
costly leading to difficulties in pioneering research while trying to please
share-holders).
98. Id. at 8. See also Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, A Sensitivity
Analysis of Expected Profitability of Pharmaceutical Research and
Development, 3 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 36, 37 (1982) (demonstrating
in a study that an inventive entity may take between 12-19 years to recoup
research costs and a reasonable profit).
99. See Poche, supra note 73, at 908 n.38 (stating that a study indicated the
rate of return on an innovation was so low that the inventive entities would
not have invested in it had they had the benefit of hindsight, yet society
perceived its benefit to be so great, that they thought the investment was
worth the return).
100. See id. at 908-09 (discussing that evidence suggests that there is not
enough protection of pharmaceutical patents). Additionally, the author
indicates that "exemptions from liability for patent infringement manifestly
decrease the scope of patent protection and should not be implemented
without a careful analysis of their impact on social welfare." Id.
101. See Judiciary Committee Revisits the Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note
25, at 27 (noting the research industry has boasted "record sales, record
profits" with an increase in R&D up to $16 billion in 1996 from $3.7 billion in
1984).
102. See id. (stating that R&D investments and sales are at record-breaking
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year guarantee of patent extension built into the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the CBO determined this period was too short for protecting a
drug.'03 Although the CBO cautions against shortcomings within
the study, it appears to be accurate. '04
The CBO report indicates the research industry is being
financially deprived of its rightful earnings.' 1 ' Although generic
companies provide a valuable service, they should not be allowed
to deprive the research industry of any legitimate financial
interest. United States law allowing the Bolar exception conflicts
with Article 30 of TRIPS because the legitimate interests of the
patent owner are prejudiced financially as demonstrated by the
CBO report. Both the ECJ and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit have agreed that this activity constitutes
an act of infringement.0
Domestic lawmaking should be in
conformity with international law promulgated by the United
States. Therefore, the Bolar Amendment must be reevaluated in
light of the TRIPS agreement.
EU countries may seek redress against the United States in
the WTO for perceived violations of the TRIPS agreement by the
enactment of the Bolar Amendment. Because of strong United
States backing in the Uruguay Round for maximal patent
protection of the inventive entity, a plea for an exception in light of
the CBO statistics may fall on deaf ears.

levels compared to 1984 when Hatch-Waxman was legislated).

But see

Mossinghoff, supra note 10, at 4-5 (describing the added costs and time
required to receive marketing approval since 1984).
103. CBO Report, supra note 90, at 8. In its analysis, the CBO determined
that an additional ten proprietary drugs of the 101 approved between 1992-95
would benefit from an increased minimum patent exclusivity period. Id. See
also Hatch-Waxman Act, supra note 21 (legislating to benefit the research
industry with a five year patent-extension in return for allowing the generic

industry to use the proprietary drug thus circumventing lengthy FDA
approval processes). But see 35 U.S.C. § 156 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating

that this extension to research companies is limited to one patent per drug).
This means that if a drug has multiple patents, only one patent will be
extended with the risk of not fully compensating the inventive entity for any
other patents on the drug.
104. CBO Report, supra note 90, at 6.

Some limitations include lacking

account of changes like R&D costs related to technology, and demand for
prescription drugs. Id. It has however been demonstrated that R&D costs
have increased and with a geriatric population explosion, prescription drug
use is sure to be on the rise.
105. Id. at 1. For an article discussing outsourcing of work in order to ration
funds, see Pete Engardio, The 21st Century Economy: How It Will Work:
Strategies, Bus. WEEK, Aug. 31, 1998, at 5, available in 1998 WL 8133747

(indicating that the costs of researching a new drug are so high and the risk of
failure so great, that it is prohibitive for many companies to enter the
pharmaceuticals business).
106. See supra Part II for a discussion of the judicial opinions related to
Bolar-type legislation.
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B. Bright Futurefor Generics
Generic companies stand to gain much in the coming years
with the help of the Bolar Amendment. Estimates of generics
controlling 20% of the total multi-source market in 1995 is
projected to grow to 70% in the next decade. 10 7 The majority of the
market growth is attributed to the Hatch-Waxman Act, which has
increased the number of dispensed generic prescriptions to nearly
50% in 1997.108 Further, by 2008 many proprietary drugs totaling
a market value of $41 billion will be off patent and in the hands of
the generic industry." These so-called "blockbuster" drugs will
enable generic sales to increase dramatically, since these drugs
are leading therapeutic agents in their respective pharmacological
categories."' The financial detriment to research companies will
be even greater in these cases because of the infringing activity
enabled by the Bolar Amendment."'
Internationally, generic drugs enjoyed $2.3 billion in sales in
1994 and projections indicate a 14% annual growth to $50 billion
by the year 2000.2 Perhaps the most shocking figure is that
research companies will only sustain 6% growth comparatively."1
While research companies are financially prejudiced, generic
companies have additional help from health maintenance
One cannot ignore that HMO's are
organizations (HMO's)."'
becoming the main source of health care for a growing and aging

107. The Road Ahead For Generics, CHAIN DRUG REV., Feb. 17, 1997, at 2,
available in 1997 WL 10433371 [hereinafter Road Ahead]. Two-thirds of all

drugs on the market have an available generic alternative. Id.
108. Generics Will Play Major Role in Limiting Health Care Costs, CHAIN
DRUG REV., Sept. 22, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 13789956 [hereinafter

Health Care Costs]. Generic drugs had an 18% dispensing rate in 1984 when
Hatch-Waxman was introduced and is projected to continue to increase beyond
the 50% mark in 1997. Id.
109. See id. at 2 (describing the future of generics as successful drugs come
off patent). Accord Road Ahead, supra note 107, at 3.

110. Id.
111. See CBO Report, supra note 90, at 5 (stating that research drug

companies will soon have to aim high to invent "blockbuster" drugs that grant
high returns quickly rather than focus on less profitable yet useful therapeutic
agents).
112. See Road Ahead, supra note 107, at 5 (describing the growth of the

generic industry and projecting a major increase in the percentage share of the
total drug market). The generics had a total world market share of 11% in
1994. Id.

113. Id.
114. See Grabowski, supra note 10, at 3-5 (stating that generic drugs are
given "priority" on a managed care formulary; physicians are encouraged to

prescribe, and pharmacists to dispense, generics whenever possible). Dr.
Grabowski further states, I[t]hese managed care policies for encouraging
generic prescribing have become a major factor contributing to the rapid
erosion of branded drugs sales revenues when patents expire." Id.
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population."'
HMO's have crafted restrictive drug formularies
utilizing generic drugs whenever possible.11 HMO's typically steer
patients toward generics by decreasing their co-pay while
awarding pharmacists
increased dispensing fees for making
17
generic substitutions.
By avoiding research costs and having a streamlined FDA
approval process, the generic industry benefits the public by
providing a cheaper drug. However, generics would not be in
business if the industry that invented the drug disappeared. Yet
smaller technology companies may never develop, and existing
ones may merge into non-existence, due to outrageous costs to
bring a new drug to market."' The Bolar Amendment catalyzes
this process by allowing the generic industry to infringe on the
patented drug, thereby granting the generics a windfall by shifting
profits away from the research company in the name of benefiting
the consumer patient."9 Although providing the public with a cost115. Quick View - PrescriptionGrowth, HEALTH & SCIENCE, Nov. 9, 1998, at
31 [hereinafter Quick View].
116. See interview with Mark Pietroski, Regional Director of Managed Care,
Bindley Western Drug Company, in Oakbrook, Illinois (Sept. 19, 1998)
(indicating that the presence of total health care packages for families means
that patients who are enrolled will get their prescriptions through the plan as
well). See also Grabowski, supra note 10, at 3-4 (stating that over 60% of
employers use pharmacy benefit management (PBM) firms covering over 137
million people). PBM's promote generic use by charging lower copayments,
and giving maximum reimbursement. Id. Physicians who write prescriptions
for brand drugs only can expect poor ratings on drug utilization reviews and
can expect to be contacted by their local PBM representative. Id.
117. Road Ahead, supra note 107, at 3-4. While providing a cheaper drug
that in many cases is accomplishing the same therapeutic effect, the HMO
provides a better price to the consumer patient while enabling the pharmacist
to make a bigger profit. Id. See generally James J. Wheaton, Generic
Competition and PharmaceuticalInnovation: The Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 433 (1986)
(describing the Hatch-Waxman Act and its impact on generic substitution).
Although research companies were successful in enacting legislation to forbid
generic substitution by pharmacists in the 1950's leading to an almost total
ban by 1972, by the late 1970's almost every state repealed these laws. Id. at
437.
118. See Paul Judge, Speeding Drug-TrialData to the FDA, BUS. WEEK, July
13, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL 8133190 (describing that each day of
delay to market can mean up to $1 million or more of lost revenue for a
pharmaceutical inventor).
119. A classic counter-argument by the generic industry is that the research
industry has no rights to an exclusive market after the patent expires.
However, this argument must fail for two reasons. First, a research drug
company must submit to a much longer deprivation of marketability until the
FDA approves its drug. This means that the drug may have a patent running
for 10-15 years before it is able to go to market. Forcing a generic industry to
wait to go through an FDA approval process in contrast takes only 1-3 years.
Second, there is nothing that the pharmaceutical company is doing illegally to
promote an exclusive market at the termination of the patent. Similar to the
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effective drug is a legitimate concern, doing so by legalizing patent
infringement is the wrong approach. The wrong message is sent to
inventors and infringers, both domestically and internationally.
C. Third Party Interests
The Bolar Amendment has benefited Americans by saving a
substantial amount of money. 12 There is no doubt prescription
drug use continues to grow nationwide. 121 Congressman Waxman
praised the Hatch-Waxman Act as enabling a "speeded up process
for marketing generics" and declared that "generics now account
for 45% of the prescriptions filled compared to 14% in 1985." 22
The Bolar Amendment serves the needs of the elderly nicely, as
almost half of patients over the age of fifty request generic drugs
and 30% routinely inquire about them.'23
However, there is mixed reaction from consumer groups on
the Hatch-Waxman Act. Although some interest groups for the
elderly believe the Act strikes the balance needed for the public,
others place an emphasis on protecting the patent holders rights
to ensure research in diseases of the aging. '2 Both viewpoints are
important enough to co-exist. The public should derive benefits of
a cost efficient drug product, but research companies should not be
approval process for a new drug, it is the FDA that stifles access to the market
for a generic drug maker. If the FDA would allow the generic company to enter
the market immediately on patent expiration, it would be within its discretion,
however, it does not follow that the inventive entity should be infringed upon
in order to effectuate this process. In summary, this demonstrates that the
FDA and not the research company is responsible for hindering market access
by the generic maker which should not translate into the right to deprive an
industry (that bestows welfare on society) of the right to a time limited patent
exclusively free from infringement.
120. See BNA, supra note 95, at 2 (stating that Senator Hatch has estimated
cost savings to the consumer as a result of the Hatch-Waxman Act are $1
billion per year).
121. See Quick View, supra note 115, at 31 (demonstrating that the two
biggest contributing factors to increased use of prescription drugs include: (1)
aging of the population; and (2) the growth of managed care which depends
upon prescription drug therapy).
122. See BNA, supra note 95, at 2 (Congressman Waxman declaring that the
burden will be heavy on anyone attempting to change the Hatch-Waxman
legislation given the successful market transformation created by allowing the
generic industry to infringe without liability); see also id. at 3 (Waxman
declaring that a proper balance was created when the Hatch-Waxman Act was
enacted).
123. See Health Care Costs, supra note 108, at 2.
124. See BNA, supra note 95, at 4 (describing the interest of Alliance for
Aging Research who warns that federal funding for research is declining,
therefore the private sector needs to be maximally protected and compensated
for the time it takes to market a drug). Calls from this group invite a
reassessment of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Id. But see id. at 9 (discussing the
Gray Panthers position that generic drugs are more affordable to the elderly
and research drugs can cost up to 25% of the elderly monthly income).
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infringed upon.
Proponents of generic drugs boast about the savings their
product bestows on society." 5 However, the research industry is
the true contributor of social welfare. A 1994 drug study showed
that a cholesterol-lowering drug decreased total mortality by
Another study published in 1998 suggests that the
30%.126
treatment of post-menopausal osteoporosis in women prevents
bone fracture. " These are just a few examples of many studies
When one
that demonstrate the benefits of drug therapy.
considers the costs deferred by drug treatment, such as: (1)
surgical intervention, (2) pain and suffering, (3) loss of time from
work, (4) quality of life decline, and (5) pre-mature loss of life, it
becomes apparent that society should reward the pharmaceutical
industry for inventing the drug with the most complete patent
protection rather than allow a generic drug maker to infringe.ln
Allowing infringement promotes the extinguishment of lifesaving
research.
Promoting human longevity through research and
development of new drugs should outweigh allowing infringement
of a patented drug. 129 Providing new pharmaceuticals to the public
can be130 achieved by means other than prejudicing a research
entity.
125. See id. at 2 (boasting that the generic industry is the only health care
industry that has decreased healthcare costs).
126. See generally Dr. Terje R. Pedersen et al., Randomized trial of
cholesterol lowering in 4444 patients with coronary heart disease: the
Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study (4S), 344 LANCET 1383-89 (1994)
(demonstrating that Zocor®, a cholesterol lowering agent, reduced total
mortality by 30%, reduced coronary mortality by 42%, reduced the need for
invasive coronary surgery by 37%, and reduced the risk of over-all coronary
events by 34%).
127. See generally Dr. Richard Eastell, Treatment of Postmenopausal
Osteoporosis, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 736-46 (1998) (reviewing present drug
therapy available for postmenopausal women at risk for and with osteoporosis
with a separate review of future modalities of drug therapy).
128. Preventive medicine is a known medical strategy that has been recently
promoted in our society. It places a greater emphasis on stopping the harm
before it occurs, rather than reacting after an adverse health incident renders
one medically compromised. An example of preventive medicine is a smoking
cessation program. It is based on the premise that it is much cheaper to pay
for someone to stop smoking today, than to treat that person for heart disease,
lung cancer or other preventable smoking related disease later in their life.
129. See Jack Burney, Extending Life Span May Be Possible, Experts Say,

1998, Oct. 1998, at 8 (stating
that there will be 100,000 centenarians by the turn of the new century and
INTERNAL MED. WORLD REP. - GERIATRIC MED.

crediting better healthcare as the reason). The article also addresses research
in genetic discoveries aimed at better understanding the aging process in
order to slow it down. Id.
130. See infra Part IV for a discussion on an alternative proposal of enabling
the public to receive prescription drugs at the same cost benefit level provided
by Hatch-Waxman, but without infringing on the inventive entity.

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:751

D. WTO Dispute Settlement of TRIPS Violations
The WTO has the power to hear disputes arising under
TRIPS. 3' Although individual private citizens are not able to
bring grievances directly to the WTO dispute settlement body
(DSB), action is typically brought by, or defended by, a member
nation."12 An aggrieved industry could compel its government to
bring a complaint against another government for an alleged
breach of TRIPS. Should the EU, or any member nation, bring an
Article 30 TRIPS complaint against the United States regarding
the Bolar Amendment, the outcome would be unclear and involve
risks for U.S. interests.
The DSB looks to customary rules taken from the Vienna
Convention and "decisions, procedures, and customary practices"
under the 1947 version of GATT. "' Interpretation of TRIPS may
arise within three separate categories." The first involves rules of
multilateral intellectual property rights (IPR) conventions,
incorporated by reference into the text of TRIPS." 5 The second
involves rules that did not arise in TRIPS as a result of prior IPR
conventions but rather are specific to TRIPS."36 The third category
is known as a hybrid because it analyzes segments7 of TRIPS that
are "derived or amended" from a multilateral IPR."1

131. ADAMANTOPOULOS, supra note 30, at 30.
132. See 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) ("No person other than the United States
(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of such an agreement... ").
133. See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement

on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in,

INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW AND THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 418 (ERNST-

Ulrich Petersmann ed. 1997) (describing the general approach to interpreting
TRIPS). It should be noted that the U.S. was not a signatory to the Vienna
Convention, however, it viewed the principles of that convention analogous to
custom, which is important since the main thrust of TRIPS interpretation in
the WTO will rely on customary principles of the global community. Id.
134. Id. at 419. The WTO anticipates that disputes will arise in the TRIPS
agreement for two reasons: (1) if a member nation has not met its

responsibility of implementing the TRIPS agreement into its national laws;

and (2) if a member nation has not "provided and given operational effect to
adequate enforcement mechanisms for the substantive standards provided."

Id.
135. Id. at 419-20. These rules have been incorporated into the text of the
TRIPS agreement from previous multilateral conventions that have addressed

intellectual property concerns and already agreed to by member nations. Id.
136. Id. During the Uruguay Round, new rules were adopted that were
previously not addressed in former conventions and represented new
intellectual property rights material. Id.
137. Id. at 420. This third category represented a category that adopted
multilateral convention agreements into TRIPS but amended or clarified them
at the Uruguay Round prior to incorporating them into the new agreement.
Id. Thus, the name "hybrid" because the old agreement was retained but
modified through the new forum.
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Multi-Lateral Type

To establish whether a country is in breach of TRIPS under
the first category, the DSB looks to the Vienna Convention,""8 and
the Berne Convention where applicable, which has been
incorporated by reference into TRIPS. 39 The Vienna convention
restricts interpretation of TRIPS by omitting any State practice
derived from activity prior to January 1, 1995.' 0 This would limit
the United States argument of existing Bolar legislation prior to
TRIPS for purposes of demonstrating established State practice.
The United States could argue it was not a signatory to the Vienna
Convention and therefore not subject to this analysis. 1" In that
case, the DSB may consider U.S. state practice in light of the
Vienna Convention to the extent those rules are incorporated into
TRIPS. 4 2
But U.S. state practice is inconsistent due to its
schizophrenic approach in carving out the Bolar Amendment
exception to its otherwise strong domestic patent laws. Further,
legislative and judicial history involving the Bolar Amendment
could be used to aid the DSB in establishing State practice, but
this would hurt the United States due to additional discrepancies
of the diametrically opposed legislative and judicial views on the
Bolar Amendment domestically.4 4 The DSB may also compare the
short period of the Bolar Amendment with a much longer
historical
custom
of
exclusive
patent
protection
for
pharmaceuticals. Viewed in a global context, the DSB will likely
find that although the Bolar Amendment is gaining popularity
with other member nations, a well-established customary
international rule on an infringement exception to pharmaceutical

138. See N. A. MARYAN GREEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, LAW OF PEACE 54

(1982) (describing how the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties shall be
used to enforce international rules of an organization). The Vienna
Convention became enforceable on January 27, 1980 and contained the
procedural rules necessary to enforce international treaties. Id.
139. See Abbott, supra note 133, at 420-21 (stating that the Vienna

convention provides that "a treaty shall be construed in accordance with the
ordinary meaning of its terms, and in its context").
140. Id. at 421. This harsh rule has been introduced because the new TRIPS
approach is necessarily stricter and more comprehensive than any prior

contemplated national or global intellectual property protection endeavor. Id.
The drafters intended to adopt prior intellectual property rules in their "strict
textual form without the surrounding context of state practice" interpreting
the agreement. Id.
141. Id. This would be a good defense, however, the U.S. may then either be
dropped from this category of analysis in favor of the second category, or may
be subject to a State practice analysis in light of TRIPS. Id.
142. Id.
143. Although judicial decisions are not the exclusive source of State practice
in the Vienna Convention, tribunal opinions are given great deference for
applying international law principles. See, e.g., LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 15-17 (8th ed. 1955).
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patents does not exist. Given these facts, the DSB will likely rule
unfavorably for the United States within this category.
2. Specific TRIPS Rules
The U.S. position becomes even weaker if the DSB analyzes
the Bolar Amendment under Article 30 as a rule specific to TRIPS
because the DSB would rely strictly on the TRIPS text." The
DSB may look to national court decisions or legislature's to aid its
decision in these matters, but this is not a procedurally required
part of the analysis. 4'
The text of Article 30 indicates the
legitimate interests of a patent owner cannot be prejudiced, taking
into account the legitimate interests of third parties. Strictly
construed, Article 30 would include any legitimate financial
interests that are unreasonably prejudiced such as those reported
by the CBO. The United States would need to demonstrate that
there is no other alternative to benefit the public other than
through an act of infringement. Further, the United States would
be required to demonstrate that the infringing act that allows
access to generic drugs outweighs the harm done to the research
industry. This burden would be heavy given that the legitimate
interests of the research industry are unreasonably prejudiced and
other means of providing a more cost-effective drug to the public
exist.
3.

Hybrid Analysis

If the DSB considered the Bolar Amendment in the third
category, it would look to State practice first, then seek to
determine how the TRIPS agreement intended to modify the state
practice.' 46 The United States argued the Bolar Amendment was
within the narrow exception of Article 30 during the Uruguay
Round.""7 However, the DSB is unlikely to agree with this
contention because of the degree of quantifiable financial prejudice
elicited by the CBO report and the qualitative adverse effect this
would have on future research endeavors by innovators.
Although the DSB is new and standards of judicial resolution
of global disputes are not clear at this point, it is reasonable to
conclude that the Bolar Amendment violates Article 30 of TRIPS.

144. See Abbott, supra note 133, at 424 (stating that the DSB would tend to
strictly interpret the text of the TRIPS agreement).
145. Id.

146. Id. at 426.
147. See Brock, supra note 67, at 10 (describing the U.S. position on Bolar
during the Uruguay Round and adding that the U.S. went through "pains" to
demonstrate that Bolar did not violate TRIPS).
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IV. SMOKING OUT BOLAR WHILE PROVIDING A COST-EFFECTIVE

DRUG
This Comment argues that the Bolar Amendment places the
United States in violation of its global commitments. Congress
should consider an alternative means of delivering cost-effective
pharmaceuticals to the public. This would avoid an international
confrontation at the WTO and preserve U.S. credibility on global
issues of patent protection.
A. Deleting the Bolar Amendment
Intellectual property protection is critical to U.S. foreign
interests and exceptions such as the Bolar Amendment undermine
U.S. goals toward maximal patent protection. Congress should
delete the Bolar Amendment and abstain from creating patent
protection exceptions. Research and innovation will maximally
flourish absent patent infringement exceptions. Anything less
invites other countries to engage in acts of piracy by using the
Bolar Amendment as a pre-text to engage in infringing activity. If
the United States violates the global treaties that it seeks to
enforce, then it cannot be heard to complain to the WTO about
other nations. Finally, disrespect for global collaboration may
unravel the harmonious transnational relationships developed this
century.
B. ProvidingPrescriptionDrugs to the Public
Upon deleting the Bolar Amendment, the United States
should seek alternative means to provide funding for prescription
drugs.'
An alternative would be to levy a tax on all tobacco
products and alcohol.'49 A nominal national tax would raise at
least $5 billion annually.'
These products are responsible for

148. For a look at how easily the U.S. government can spend its money on
arguably less important matters. See Military Can't Do 2-War Mission,
Senators Told, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 30, 1998, § 1, at 7 (stating that the U.S. has
spent $9 billion on peace-keeping since 1995 on Bosnia-Hercegovina, when it
originally was expected to cost $2 billion). When one compares this with
Senator Hatch's statement in saving the public $1 billion per year, it seems
that the U.S. is quicker to interject itself into a foreign conflict in which it has
no vital national interest than to provide its own citizens with the difference in
savings that Bolar creates.
149. For an example of a "sin tax" levied for the public funding of a stadium
project, see Timothy Heider, Cleveland Business League Endorses Tax for
Stadium, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 24, 1995, at 2B, available in 1995 WL 11012585
(discussing an alcohol and tobacco tax in order to fund the local stadium
renovation).
150. See CDC's TIPS-1995 Nat'l Household Survey on Drug Use: Tobacco
Statistics (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/samhsa.htm>
(estimating 61 million Americans were smoking in 1995, representing 29% of
the U.S. population). Of these 61 million, 4.5 million were adolescents age 12-
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many preventable diseases,' and an individual who purchases
these products would benefit society by displacing the cost of
prescription medication. The revenue could be dispersed through
block grants to the individual states and would then be
implemented to subsidize the difference created by deleting the
Bolar Amendment. Patent rights of the research pharmaceutical
industry would be respected, and the public would continue to
benefit from State subsidies. The generic industry would have the
right to begin research on the proprietary product only when the
patent expires. The interest of the public would be served through
the tax subsidy, 52 and drug makers would be assured of maximal
patent protection.

17. Id. An average package of cigarettes costs approximately $3. A 2% tax
would raise more than $1.3 billion per year on an average one pack per day.
This statistic does not include smokeless tobacco or cigars, nor does it include
beer or liquor. Factoring in these additional products would raise more than
$5 billion annually.
151. CDC's TIPS-CigaretteSmoking-Related Mortality (visited Jan. 16, 1999)
<http:www.cdc.gov/tobacco/mortali.htm>.
The CDC estimates 400,000
Americans die annually from smoking related diseases with direct medical
costs exceeding $50 billion. Id. Smoking related diseases include cancer,
hypertension, heart disease, stroke, pneumonia, bronchitis, emphysema,
chronic airway obstruction and burn deaths. Id.
152. It is arguable that this may cause the consumer to spend less money on
other goods, however $5 billion is minimal in a $5 trillion economy. Given the
price inelasticity of tobacco and alcohol, it is unlikely that either the tobacco or
alcohol industry will suffer a tremendous loss.

